How does the Xi–Trump summit affect the strategic equilibrium of US–China relations, and what might the implications be for international security and the global economy? – ELIAMEP experts’ views

Ino Afentouli, Senior Policy Advisor; Head of the Observatory of Geopolitics and Diplomacy, ELIAMEP

The Xi–Trump summit brings together two vastly different personalities who serve as the primary architects of their countries’ strategic policies. The first, a scion of the Party elite, embodies the Chinese perception of the ‘Middle Kingdom’—of China as the realm between heaven and earth. In this view, China does not need to keep pace with time; instead, time is seen as an asset that works in its favour. Trump, by contrast, is operating on a far more constrained timeline, with only two years remaining of his presidency. His penchant for taking decisions on his own often leads to choices detrimental to his country’s interests, as evidenced by the course of the war in Iran. There can be no doubt that the Chinese leadership has taken note of the mistakes the US has made in its handling of the crisis.

Trump’s personality makes it more likely that the US, rather than China, will fall into the so-called Thucydides Trap. As an ascending power, and true to its strategic tradition of defeating an opponent without engaging in battle, China has the luxury of patience. This is something Trump’s America lacks. The US has to preserve the hegemony it has constructed over eight decades, underpinned by its strategic partnerships across Europe and Asia. But Trump is allergic to alliances; under his presidency, the US risks forfeiting the strategic added value that has enabled American primacy in both continents.

China’s approach to establishing spheres of influence, not only within its own periphery but also on a broader international scale, will be crucial to the emerging balance of power. Chinese strategy over recent decades has prioritized economic penetration as a primary vehicle for exerting political influence. During his 15 years in power, Xi has combined economic power with military might. Huge investments have been made in the armed forces; furthermore, the recent purges—which effectively decapitated virtually the entire military high command—underscore that establishing military primacy remains among his highest strategic priorities. Will this primacy be projected defensively or offensively? The answer to this question will determine the global equilibrium in the years ahead. Xi could exploit the vulnerabilities in Trump’s character, manoeuvring him towards Thucydides’ trap. Possessing strategic patience, Xi is capable of ensnaring Trump in the logic of war through actions that do not jeopardize China’s own security. In this light, the debacle in Iran assumes far greater proportions for the US than a mere military failure. One can only hope the Chinese leader does not pursue such a course while Trump is in office.
Eleni Ekmetsioglou, Non-Resident Fellow, ELIAMEP; Senior Fellow, British American Security Information Council (BASIC)

The Xi-Trump meeting happens at a very unfavorable moment for the US. As many analysts have argued, with the US trapped in the Middle East, China seems to have the upper hand on most of the agenda items. Whereas tariffs, technology and probably Taiwan will dominate the discussions, it  might, nevertheless, be the right moment for the US to try and press on other -equally important and highly consequential- issues such as nuclear risk reduction measures. Given that US pundits and official intelligence reports make ominous speculations about the future trajectory of China’s nuclear arsenal, it is in US interests to push for an institutionalized track 1 dialogue for both parties to work towards a better mutual understanding on nuclear issues that might lead to tangible risk reduction measures such as the establishment of a formal missile launch notification regime, for instance. With the quantitative increase in China’s nuclear arsenal, the US has been feeling that its current nuclear modernization might not be fit for purpose in a world with two peer competitors, Russia and China. After the expiration of the New Start treaty last February, the US is not bound by restrictions over the numbers of its deployed warheads. With both countries investing in their nuclear arsenals for quantitative and qualitative improvements, the nuclear component inevitably plays a bigger role in the relationship creating a dangerous dynamic where even a minor crisis between the two powers will have the potential of turning into a nuclear crisis with unprecedented consequences for the region and the whole planet. The Biden administration scored a major success when the two parties agreed to always include a human in the loop for nuclear decision making. AI and nuclear command and control was the low hanging fruit for the Biden administration but it could mark a great starting point towards a more diverse dialogue on precise risk reduction measures in order to  boost crisis stability between the two countries. Hopefully, the Trump administration will be prepared to press Xi on this deeply consequential aspect of the bilateral relationship and continue the positive trend that the Biden administration kicked off in San Francisco back in 2023.

George Tzogopoulos, Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP; European Institute of Nice, Centre international de formation européenne (CIFE)

Understanding China remains an extremely complex undertaking in the West. For instance, while US think tanks and media assess that President Trump will not hold the upper hand in his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Beijing does not operate within this Western paradigm. From a Chinese perspective, it matters little where the White House is occupied by Donald Trump, Joe Biden or anyone else. The web of Sino-American relations is so intricate that a single summit—regardless of its gravity—cannot be expected to yield a definitive breakthrough. China predicates its success on its own strategic choices, negotiating only to secure a measure of relative stability in its relations with Washington. While stability serves the interests of both nations, the path forward is arduous—a reality consistent with historical precedent. Although Sino-American competition is set to intensify, it remains within the power of both states to mitigate the risk of catastrophic consequences. The United States will remain the sole superpower, yet China—as the world’s second-largest economy—will command an amplified voice in global economic and geopolitical affairs. It is this very dynamic that is causing tremors in the international system, as the United States is forced to adapt to a reality far removed from the unipolar era it enjoyed for two decades following the Cold War.

Dimitris Tsarouhas, Senior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP; Professor, Center for European and Transatlantic Studies (CEUTS) at Virginia Tech

Measured tones and muted expectations

In a normal political and economic climate, a meeting between a US President and his Chinese counterpart would be front-page news here in Washington, sparking a deluge of analysis aimed at gauging Beijing’s intentions. However, the current climate is anything but normal—at least for Donald Trump.

With inflation hitting 3.8%, its highest level in nearly three years, the gap between the President’s campaign promises and the economic reality has reignited public frustration with the administration’s fiscal direction. Pledges to shield Americans from an unstable global environment are being belied on the ground. Not only is the US embroiled in yet another conflict in the Middle East at great economic and political cost, the administration’s tariff regime—aimed largely at Chinese imports—is also faltering amidst judicial scrutiny and bureaucratic deadlock.

Against this backdrop, the shift since their last October 2025 summit could not be clearer: it is now President Xi who holds the stronger hand (to echo Trump’s infamous remark to his Ukrainian counterpart). Even as the US is being forced into a de facto capitulation in its undeclared—yet very real—trade war with China, Beijing continues to dictate the terms of the broader geopolitical game. It does so by imposing unilateral export restrictions on its rare earth minerals and by bolstering the Russian war machine on the Ukrainian front. And while the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz undoubtedly burdens the Chinese economy as well, officials in Beijing remain optimistic. They anticipate that their recurring tactic—promising multi-billion-dollar commodity purchases—will appease President Trump and pave the way for ‘constructive’ talks. In practice, this means negotiations that bypass the core of Chinese ambitions: namely, the status of Taiwan and the subjugation of neighbouring states’ rights in the South China Sea, where Beijing continues to assert a unilateral right of intervention. Against this backdrop, Washington harbours few illusions regarding the outcome of this meeting—and rightfully so.

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