Turkey’s peripheral policy, creating a satellite system.
Constantinos Kyprios
Marketing Officer, Katradis SA
Turkey’s foreign policy has undergone significant evolution over the past two decades, shifting from its traditional Western-oriented stance to a more autonomous, multifaceted approach. A critical component of this transformation has been the emergence of Turkey’s so-called “satellite states policy,” a term used to describe Ankara’s growing influence over politically, economically, and culturally aligned states in its near abroad and beyond. Turkey’s strategic location at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East positions allow it to project power in these regions. By fostering alliances and dependencies and promoting military interventions[i], Turkey seeks to enhance its regional influence, secure its borders, and project power into surrounding areas[ii]. Further by expanding its export markets and secure the adjust energy routes it looks in to establishing stronger ties with neighboring states and control the adjust areas. Further by cultivating satellite-like relationships, Turkey ensures access to vital resources and trade corridors while it allow it to project power and to present its self as the regional dominating power.
On those terms Turkey use several instruments in the pursuit of this policy. By leveraging its Ottoman heritage and shared cultural and religious connections, particularly with Turkic and Muslim-majority nations, Turkey has sought to rekindle historic bonds to foster alignment and loyalty and ensuring they align with Ankara’s strategic interests mitigates threats such as terrorism, refugee flows, and external meddling by rival powers like Russia, the EU, or even the U.S. Establishing military control, investing and promoting Turkish culture, Ankara looks in to expanding its influence all over the adjust region and enhance its geopolitical influence. As such it looks to expand its natural and political borders and the revival of its historic influence[iii].
In order to apply influence to the states that Turkey want to incorporate to its satellite system, it employs a mix of soft and hard power tools. Through trade agreements, foreign direct investment, and development projects, Turkey has become a key economic partner for many countries in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. For example, Turkish construction firms dominate infrastructure projects in these regions. The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) and institutions like the Yunus Emre Institute promote Turkish language, culture, and education abroad, fostering a favorable image of Turkey. Scholarships for students from allied states further strengthen ties. Further, Turkey’s defense industry has emerged as a powerful tool of influence. By supplying drones, military equipment, and training, Ankara has deepened military ties with countries like Azerbaijan, Somalia, and Qatar. While at the same time it deploys proxies in those states to reinforce them as and its position within[iv]. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war highlighted Turkey’s ability to shift regional balances in favor of its allies.
Finally, Turkey exercises Political Support and Energy Diplomacy. By the first it often acts as a patron for governments or political movements aligned with its ideology, particularly Islamist or nationalist groups. This support has been visible in Libya, where Turkey backed the Government of National Accord (GNA), and in Syria, where it has supported opposition factions. The second cultivates in its ambitions to become an energy hub have led to partnerships with states that provide critical transit routes or energy resources, such as Azerbaijan via the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP).
As such Turkey is building a network of satellite states from the Caucasus and the Mediterranean to the Red Sea. The most important state in the north is Azerbaijan. Turkey and Azerbaijan share a robust and multi-dimensional relationship deeply rooted in historical, cultural, and geopolitical factors. The phrase “one nation, two states,” famously coined by Azerbaijan’s former president Heydar Aliyev, encapsulates the unique nature of this bilateral partnership. Turkey’s policy toward Azerbaijan reflects its strategic interests, regional ambitions, and commitment to fostering an alliance that is mutually beneficial in areas such as security, energy, and culture.
In this respect Turkey has incorporate a policy towards Azerbaijan that look in strengthen strategic and political partnership by supporting its sovereignty and territorial integrity, particularly regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict[v]. Ankara has been a vocal advocate for Azerbaijan in international forums, challenging Armenia’s position and pushing for resolutions favorable to Baku. Further it has strengthened their Bilateral Relations
were Turkey and Azerbaijan have institutionalized their cooperation through agreements like the Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support Agreement (2010), which underscores their commitment to collective defense and joint action in case of aggression against either state. This cooperation was further reaffirmed in June 15, 2021 with the Shusha Declaration which all related agreements were upgraded to a level of alliance[vi].
At the cornerstone of this cooperation stands their military cooperation. Turkey has provided military training, weapons, and modern equipment to Azerbaijan’s armed forces, while during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Turkey played a decisive role by providing Azerbaijan with Bayraktar TB2 drones, military advisors, and political backing plus numbers of Syrian fighters that boosted the Azeri armed forces[vii]. This significantly enhanced Azerbaijan’s operational capabilities, leading to its victory in the conflict. Further, regular joint military exercises, such as the “TurAz Eagle,” are held to enhance interoperability and readiness between their armed forces. This was part of a broader cooperation and infiltration of Turkey in the country that began in 2011 and by 2020 resulted in Azerbaijan acquiring countless of military hardware from Turkey. For the matter in 2020 the procurement of military hardware from Turkey amounted up to 120 million dollars[viii].
Fundamental policy includes the energy and economic collaboration between the two states, The energy sector is a central pillar of Turkish-Azerbaijani cooperation. Azerbaijan’s energy resources flow to international markets via Turkey, solidifying both nations’ roles as critical players in regional energy dynamics. Key projects include, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline that Transports Azerbaijani oil to Turkey and onward to global markets and the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP). A vital segment of the Southern Gas Corridor, delivering Azerbaijani natural gas to Europe via Turkey.
In the Turkish Geopolitical Alignment, Turkey views Azerbaijan as a bridge to Central Asia and a key partner in its broader efforts to unite Turkic-speaking nations under frameworks like the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Further through its alignment with Azerbaijan, Turkey look into countering the influence of regional powers such as Russia and Iran. By supporting Azerbaijan’s independence and strengthening bilateral ties, Turkey enhances its strategic depth in the Caucasus. Emphasizing in this,
the 2020 war marked a turning point, with Turkey emerging as Azerbaijan’s most steadfast ally. The victory also paved the way for Turkey’s deeper involvement in the Caucasus, including discussions about regional connectivity projects like the Zangezur Corridor. As such, the Shusha Declaration, signed in the city of Shusha, reaffirmed the strategic partnership between the two nations, emphasizing cooperation in defense, energy, and regional issues. Further as Europe is seeking alternatives to Russian energy, Turkey and Azerbaijan have intensified their collaboration to expand the Southern Gas Corridor, bolstering their roles as key energy providers. Turkey’s policy toward Azerbaijan is a cornerstone of its regional strategy, combining shared heritage with mutual strategic interests. By fostering a deep and multifaceted partnership, Ankara not only enhances its influence in the Caucasus but also strengthens its role as a key regional power in the area. A desire held by Turkey from the Ottoman period, as during WW1 Turkey pushed deep in the Caucasus even while the allied troops had reached Halepo in the Middle East. A desire that looks into uniting the Turkish speaking people of the area under her banner and control the oil rich resources. As the alliance continues to evolve, it will likely remain a defining feature of the geopolitics of the region and during the war with Armenia Turkey went as far as threatening Armenia with war in case the later intervened in the territory of Nakhchivan[ix].
Regarding the Mediterranean a significant pillar of Turkey grand policy is Syria. Turkey’s policy toward Syria has been shaped by a complex interplay of security concerns, what sees as ‘humanitarian obligations’, and geopolitical ambitions. Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Turkey has transitioned from fostering close ties with the Assad government to becoming one of the most active external actors in the conflict[x]. This shift reflects Turkey’s evolving strategic priorities and its efforts to address threats emanating from its southern border as and to expand its sphere of influence in to the country[xi]. Its key objectives are to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish autonomous region in northern Syria, which Ankara views as a direct threat to its territorial integrity due to its links with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and to combat what sees as terrorist groups, that operate near its borders. Further Turkey looks to secure its southern border to prevent cross-border attacks, smuggling, and infiltration by armed groups, while establishing a buffer zone in northern Syria to protect Turkish territory. Those actions as and its intervention in Syria, is part of a broader geopolitical agenda that looks to enhance its role as a key power broker in the Syrian conflict and its eventual resolution, while counterbalance the influence of rival powers, including Russia, Iran, and the U.S., in Syria.
In this respect Turkey has taken a series of actions in Syria that include a number of operations that took place from 2016 to 2020, that aimed to reduce Kurdish presence in the Syrian Turkish borders and protect Turkish backed armed groups[xii]. Those military operations in northern Syria, aimed at addressing its security concerns and creating zones of influence while provided political, military, and logistical support to opposition groups, particularly the Syrian National Army (SNA)[xiii] and other factions opposed to the Assad regime. This effort began in 2012 and until the fall of the Asad Regime all areas outside the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Asad Forces were under Turkish patronage one way or another. The SNA a coalition of 22 rebel militias with a force of 70.000 armed personnel is the cornerstone of the Turkish policy in Syria and many times referred as the ‘Turkish Free Syrian Army’[xiv]. The SNA is the effort to create something that resembles a regular army under Turkish command and directions, and as such serving as Turkish instrument in Syria. It is those fighters that Turkey often use in Libya and in Armenia to reinforce its allies there.
Those fighters are not only trained in Syria but also in the Ulasli camp[xv] on the Marmara region in the Golcuk distict of Kocaeli. This former Turkish navy facility under the name of ‘Navla Forces Command Ulasli Special Education Center Command’, has a capacity of 600 personnel and the training is taking place by the SADAT private security company, the Turkish equilevent of Wanger. As such it was in Syria where it was first developed the new way of policy of Turkey, that of the involvement in proxy warfare using local forces boosted by quasi-governmental agencies such as the SADAT. A policy that was expanded as it was noted in Azerbaijan and Libya.
With its interference in the Syrian conflict, Turkey has achieved to established control over significant portions of northern Syria, creating a buffer zone and reducing cross-border threats while positioning itself as an indispensable actor in the Syrian conflict, capable of influencing negotiations and the future of the region. Further the
Turkish military operations have disrupted YPG control in northern Syria and prevented the establishment of a contiguous Kurdish-controlled region while the SNA action has resulted to the creation of three semi-autonomous Turkish protectorates in Azaz-Jarabulus, Afrin and Tal Abyad-Ras Al-Ayn[xvi].
Turkey’s Syria policy reflects a delicate balancing act between national security and geopolitical ambitions. While Ankara has achieved notable successes in securing its borders and asserting its influence, it faces significant challenges in managing the long-term consequences of its involvement in Syria. As the conflict evolves, Turkey’s ability to navigate complex alliances and address domestic pressures will be critical in shaping the future of its Syria policy. Gaining a foothold in Syria or as the situation is developed the whole of Syria under its sphere of influence, it will allow Tukey to expand its claims and influence in the eastern coastline of the Mediterranean and to further exercise influence in the Middle East.
Libya is another focus point in its grand strategy and it has become a focal point of its foreign policy, particularly since the outbreak of Libya’s civil conflict in 2011. This policy reflects Ankara’s strategic ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean, its desire to project influence in North Africa, and its commitment to supporting political allies in the region. Significant reason to Turkeys involvement in the Libyan civil war has the discovery of large amounts of hydrocarbon resources in the adjust sea as and the exclusion of its self from the energy politics of Eastern Mediterranean[xvii].
Turkey’s engagement in Libya is multidimensional, encompassing military, economic, political, and energy interests. As such the key objectives of Turkey’s policy in Libya is to back the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli, led by Fayez al-Sarraj, as opposed to the rival Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Haftar. This aligns with Turkey’s broader regional policy of supporting Islamist-leaning political factions, often tied to the Muslim Brotherhood. Further Turkey sees Libya as a gateway to expand its influence in North Africa and countering rivals such as Egypt, the UAE, and France, who support Haftar’s LNA, while securing its energy needs and assert its maritime claims in the Eastern Mediterranean through agreements on exclusive economic zones (EEZs).This policy is fallowing the lines of the ‘Blue Homeland’ doctrine according to the general perception to expand its maritime borders and secure what Ankara sees as its geopolitical interests[xviii].
In order to achieve those targets, Turkey has proceeded in a number of actions that include military aid and support, where in November 2019, Turkey signed two landmark agreements with the GNA. One defined EEZs between Turkey and Libya and so bolstering Turkey’s claims in the Eastern Mediterranean and second Security Cooperation Agreement, Providing the legal framework for Turkey’s military assistance to the GNA. Those agreements have created the codex for the deployment of forces and equipment that include the dispatch of military advisors, drones, and advanced weapons to support the GNA[xix] during its conflict with the LNA. Further Turkey facilitated the deployment of Syrian mercenaries to bolster GNA forces on the ground. As such the Turkish military support was pivotal in helping the GNA repel Haftar’s forces, particularly in the Battle of Tripoli in 2020. For the matter Turkey went as far as actively supporting the GNA with its own forces as President Erdogan stated in February 2020 that “our gallant soldiers together with our units from the Syrian National Army are now in Libya”[xx]. Notably the cooperation had already began since 2013 when SADAT signed an agreement with the Government of National Accord (GNA)[xxi] regarding the construction of a military sport facility and vehicle maintenance structure. SADAT was again the organization that took the initiative and managed and forward Syrian fighters in Libya, their numbers estimated anywhere between 5.000 and 17.000[xxii].
Turkeys’ involvement in Libya is the epitome of her policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and looks at broadening its strategic influence in the region[xxiii]. The 2019 maritime agreement with the GNA challenged rival claims in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly those of Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt. This agreement looks so Turkey can have a say in the exploitation of energy resources in the region. Further, Libya’s vast oil reserves are another incentive for Turkish involvement, as Ankara seeks favorable terms for future energy cooperation, while at the same time, Turkey uses its presence in Libya to counterbalance the influence of countries like Egypt, the UAE, and France, which back Haftar and oppose Turkey’s regional ambitions and establishing itself as a key power broker in Libya, enhancing its geopolitical influence in North Africa[xxiv] and the Mediterranean. Turkey’s policy toward Libya reflects its broader ambitions to project power and influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa. By combining military intervention, diplomatic engagement, and economic cooperation, Ankara has positioned itself as a critical player in Libya’s future. However, the challenges of geopolitical rivalries, Libya’s internal instability, and the balancing act between its ambitions and regional realities will shape the trajectory of Turkey’s Libya policy in the years to come. Further Ankara’s Libya policy reflects its desire of the Blue Homeland where Turkey is planning to use its influence to establish its desires for control of the resources of the Eastern Mediterranean as it has been displayed by the relative memorandum.
Turkey’s policy toward Somalia has evolved into one of the most comprehensive and multifaceted relationships in its African diplomacy. Since the early 2010s, Turkey has emerged as one of Somalia’s most influential partners, blending humanitarian, economic, and military support with a broader vision of regional engagement[xxv]. This relationship reflects Turkey’s aspirations to expand its influence in the Horn of Africa while contributing to Somalia’s stabilization and development. Turkey has invested heavily in rebuilding Somalia’s infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, and roads. Turkish businesses are active in Somalia, particularly in construction, transportation, and energy sectors. Somalia is also a growing market for Turkish exports, with trade volumes steadily increasing.
Its military involvement is another aspect at the epicenter of Turkey’s Somalia policy where for its role in rebuilding the Somali National Army (SNA), navy and security forces is expected to receive in return the 30% of Somalian Exclusive Economic Zone[xxvi]. Further Turkey has established a military training base, TURKSOM[xxvii], in Mogadishu since 2017, its largest overseas military facility. This base has trained thousands of Somali soldiers, aiming to enhance the country’s security and counterterrorism capabilities. Turkey also supports Somalia’s fight against the extremist group Al-Shabaab, which poses a significant threat to the country’s stability. Turkish-trained Somali forces have been instrumental in counterterrorism operations while it has provided military equipment and logistical support to strengthen Somalia’s defense infrastructure.
Turkeys’ involvement in Somalia is part of its gran strategy that looks Somalia as a gateway to the Horn of Africa, a region critical for maritime trade routes and geopolitical influence. This cooperation was ratified again in June 17th when the Somali President meet with the Turkish Foreign Minister as part of the meetings following the two major agreements signed between Turkey and Somalia in 2024 regarding maritime and defense issues as and oil and gas cooperation[xxviii]. Its engagement with Somalia bolsters its role as a key player in African diplomacy. While its embassy serves as a hub for Turkish-African relations. As such Turkey’s sustained engagement has positioned it as one of Somalia’s most trusted allies, fostering a relationship characterized by mutual respect and cooperation. And through its presence in Somalia, Turkey has expanded its influence in the Horn of Africa, gaining access to strategic maritime routes and countering the presence of rival powers like the UAE and China. Turkey’s policy toward Somalia represents a blend of humanitarian commitment, strategic interest, and cultural diplomacy. By investing in Somalia’s stabilization and development, Turkey has not only solidified its role as a key partner to Mogadishu but also enhanced its influence in the Horn of Africa and beyond.
A policy that began with the Africa Action Plan in 1998 and evolved in Turkey becoming a strategic partner of the African Union by 2008. The results are diplomatic beside strategic, as when Turkey made its successful bid to become a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council in 2009, it had gained the support of fifty one of the fifty-three African states. Today up to thirty African states have singed security agreements with Turkey and it is a member of the African Development Bank Group since 2013. Further Turkey has a keen interest in promoting its defense industry in the African states and becoming a security partner, a move that manage with great success[xxix].
However, the Turkish influence expands beyond the Caucasus and the communication line Eastern Mediterranean – Black Sea and Turkey seeks to exercise influence also in the Balkans and most notably Albania. Turkey’s military and economic presence in Albania reflects a strategic partnership that has deepened in recent years. This relationship is part of Turkey’s broader efforts to expand its influence in the Balkans, a region with historical, cultural, and geopolitical significance to Ankara. Albania, given its predominantly Muslim population and historical ties with the Ottoman Empire, is a key focus of Turkish outreach.
Turkey plays a pivotal role in supporting and modernizing Albania’s military. Turkey has actively provided military assistance to Albania, including training programs, equipment donations, and infrastructure development. Turkish military academies have trained numerous Albanian officers, fostering a close relationship between the armed forces of the two nations. Additionally, Turkey has been involved in the modernization of Albanian military bases, most notably the Ku cove Air Base, which is being transformed into a NATO facility with Turkish support. Further it has taken use of former Soviet naval bases in Albania that allows its projection of power into the Central Mediterranean and the Adriatic Sea.
Beyond direct military cooperation, Turkey’s influence extends to its efforts in promoting security initiatives in the region. This includes counter-terrorism cooperation and intelligence sharing, particularly concerning extremist groups. These partnerships bolster Turkey’s strategic foothold in Albania and reinforce its role as a key security actor in the Balkans. Economically, Turkey is one of Albania’s largest foreign investors, with significant contributions in sectors such as energy, infrastructure, banking, and telecommunications. Turkish companies have invested heavily in Albanian infrastructure, including the construction of roads, airports, and power plants. The Turkish-owned Banka Kombëtare Tregtare (BKT) is one of the leading financial institutions in Albania, further embedding Turkey’s economic presence.
Turkey’s growing military and economic influence in Albania aligns with its broader ambition to reassert itself as a key player in the Balkans. This presence strengthens Turkey’s geopolitical reach while providing Albania with much-needed economic support and military modernization. The policy of infiltration in Albania is part of the general concept of Turkey’s policy of Strategic depth, and as such Albania operates as a foothold of Ankara desires in the region. By strengthening Albanian roles in the Western Balkans, Ankara has found a way in to FYROM, Kosovo and Bosnia Herzegovina through a general policy that looks through military cooperations, trade and investment to also revive the modern Neo-Ottomanic self-perception and Identity[xxx].
Never the less although out of the main area of the Eastern Mediterranean -North Africa- Red Sea space, Turkey has been madding also similar infiltrations in Qatar, based on the similarities regarding Sunni political Islamism and shared adversaries, Turkey has deployed troops in the Gulf state since 2015. The military cooperation includes both land as and naval bases in the area, while the Turkish military industry has achieved significant sales as the procurement from Qatar military of the TB 2 armed drones. Further cooperation between naval firms of the two states have also taken place[xxxi].
Turkey’s satellite states policy is not without its challenges, critics accuse Turkey of attempting to resurrect Ottoman-era dominance, leading to resistance from nationalist factions in some states. The strain on Turkey’s economy, including inflation and currency depreciation, has raised questions about its ability to sustain its expansive foreign policy ambitions. Turkey’s actions often bring it into conflict with major powers like Russia, the EU, and the U.S., complicating its efforts to maintain a balanced foreign policy. Turkey’s satellite states policy reflects its ambition to reassert itself as a regional and global power. By combining economic, cultural, and military tools, Ankara has effectively built spheres of influence that enhance its strategic depth and bolster its standing on the world stage. However, balancing these ambitions with domestic challenges and international rivalries will remain a critical test for Turkey’s policymakers in the years ahead.
[i] Robinson K. (July 11, 2023) ‘Turkey’s Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions’ Council on Foreign Affairs.[ii] Dr Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak (January 27, 2021), ‘Turkish Militias and Proxies’, The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and security.[iii] Sarian Ara Joseph (January 4, 2025), “Proxy vs Surrogate Warfare: Analyzing Turkey’s Strategic Ambitions in Syria’,[iv] Dr Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak (January 27, 2021), ‘Turkish Militias and Proxies’, The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and security.[v] ‘A Comparative Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy on the Azerbaijan -Armenia Conflict (1988-2020)’, Insight Turkey, June 25 2023[vi] Veliyev Cavid (August 20, 2023),’Azerbaijan-Turliye Military Relations in the Shadow of the Negotiations with Armenia;, Moshe Dayan Center.[vii] Dr Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak (January 27, 2021), ‘Turkish Militias and Proxies’, The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and security.[viii] A Comparative Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy on the Azerbaijan -Armenia Conflict (1988-2020)’, Insight Turkey, June 25 2023[ix] A Comparative Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy on the Azerbaijan -Armenia Conflict (1988-2020)’, Insight Turkey, June 25 2023[x] Yuksel Engin ( April 31, 2020) p 139, ‘Turkey’s approach to proxy war in the Middle East and North Africa’, Security and Defence Quarterly[xi] Yuksel Engin ( April 31, 2020), ‘Turkey’s approach to proxy war in the Middle East and North Africa’, Security and Defence Quarterly.[xii] Sarlis M. ‘Turkey’s regional policy in the shadow of the Gaza War’, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies.[xiii] Dr Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak (January 27, 2021), ‘Turkish Militias and Proxies’, The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and security.[xiv] Dr Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak (January 27, 2021), ‘Turkish Militias and Proxies’, The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and security.[xv] Dr Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak (January 27, 2021), ‘Turkish Militias and Proxies’, The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and security.[xvi] Yuksel Engin ( April 31, 2020) p 144, ‘Turkey’s approach to proxy war in the Middle East and North Africa’, Security and Defence Quarterly.[xvii] Yuksel Engin ( April 31, 2020) p 140, ‘Turkey’s approach to proxy war in the Middle East and North Africa’, Security and Defence Quarterly.[xviii] Susler Bugra (August 2022), ‘Turkey’s involvement in the Libyan Conflict, the Geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean and Drone Warfare’, LSE Ideas, Strategic update[xix] Yuksel Engin ( April 31, 2020) p 145, ‘Turkey’s approach to proxy war in the Middle East and North Africa’, Security and Defence Quarterly.[xx] Yuksel Engin ( April 31, 2020) p 146, ‘Turkey’s approach to proxy war in the Middle East and North Africa’, Security and Defence Quarterly.[xxi] Dr Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak (January 27, 2021), ‘Turkish Militias and Proxies’, The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and security.[xxii] Spyer Jonathan (August 5, 2024), ‘Why Turkeys Erdogan Threatened Israel with a Proxy War’, The Jerusalem Post.[xxiii] Susler Bugra (August 2022), ‘Turkey’s involvement in the Libyan Conflict, the Geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean and Drone Warfare’, LSE Ideas, Strategic update[xxiv] Susler Bugra (August 2022), ‘Turkey’s involvement in the Libyan Conflict, the Geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean and Drone Warfare’, LSE Ideas, Strategic update[xxv] Baez Kiran (June 18, 2024), ‘Turkey singed two major deals with Somalia, Will it be able to implement them?’, Atlantic council.[xxvi] Baez Kiran (June 18, 2024), ‘Turkey singed two major deals with Somalia, Will it be able to implement them?’, Atlantic council.[xxvii] Demirtas Tunc (January 3 2025), ‘Turkiye’s strategic role in Somalia’s development and security’, Anadolu Ajanci[xxviii] Baez Kiran (June 18, 2024), ‘Turkey singed two major deals with Somalia, Will it be able to implement them?’, Atlantic council.[xxix] Donelli Federico (February 29th 2024), ‘Red Sea politics: Why Turkey is helping Somalia defend its waters’, Defence Web.[xxx] Lami Blendi (January-April 2017),’ Influence of Turkish Foreign Policy in Albania’, European Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies,[xxxi] Cohen Hay Eytan (January 27 2021), “Turkish Militias and Proxies’, The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and security.
