Turkey’s maritime ambitions a source of conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean.

By Constantinos Kyprios*

Over the past decade, Ankara has embarked on an ambitious maritime strategy, encapsulated in the concept of the “Blue Homeland” (Mavi Vatan), signaling its determination to assert its influence in regional waters. These ambitions are reshaping Turkey’s naval capabilities, its diplomatic stance, and the geopolitics of surrounding seas bringing her in direct conflict not only with Greece and Cyprus that preserves decades long hostilities, but also with Eastern Mediterranean powers Israel and Egypt and even France.

At the core of this naval expansion stand the concept of the “Blue Homeland” doctrine, introduced by retired Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, and highlighting Turkey’s maritime aspirations. This strategy envisions a Turkey that maximizes its control over its maritime domains, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Sea. The doctrine promotes the defense of what Ankara consider Turkey’s rights to resources and maritime zones in the area, especially against what sees as the claims from neighboring states especially regarding Greece and Cyprus.

This vision includes Turkey’s entitlement to large swathes of the continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). Turkey’s naval strategy is a multifaceted approach designed to secure its maritime interests and assert regional influence. This however does not exclude the vision of Turkey for Global presence in areas such as the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Gulf of Aden. Its stated target is to contribute in the safety of global maritime trade and ensure the safety of shipping traffic[i].

In this codex the Turkish navy has taken initiatives such as the training of Somalia’s navy as and a forward deployment of the Turkish navy in Somalia’s maritime zones to tackle terrorism, illegal fishing, smuggling, piracy as and other threats, according to the Defense and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement and for the duration of 10 years[ii]. Further more as part of Turkey’s general ambitions, a drilling ship is planned to be dispatched for exploration of hydrocarbon resources.

However, this is an indication of Turkey’s naval and strategic aspirations in concern with those that upfold in the Eastern Mediterranean and the upheaval that are and can cause. They are also an indication to the extent of the Grand Policy of Turkey as it upfolds over a decade now, a policy that sees exercising influence beside Somalia also in Qatar and Sudan. As such, the power projection of Turkey’s military power or the threat that poses to its neighbor states, is in a far greater scale than a rising regional power and to the extent of a nation that try to present its self as a middle global power equal to France and Italy the least.

According to those policies, Turkey sees its self in promoting or at least safeguarding its national interest in the adjust sea areas with emphasis in the East Mediterranean and regarding energy transportation and production, maritime trade routes especially controlling them, and as such influencing global economy[iii].  In this way Turkey it is not only upgrading its deterrence power but also it has developed a naval arm with the respected indigenous industry in order to operate and control the adjust seas and swift this way the geopolitical balances. Emphasizing in this policy Erdogan has stated that “We are aware that to live peacefully in our lands, we must have a strong and effective navy both in our Blue Homeland and in distant geographies,”

The Eastern Mediterranean, rich in natural gas reserves, has become a critical battleground for this strategy. Turkey’s deployment of seismic research vessels and drilling ships in contested waters demonstrates its resolve to secure a share of these resources. As such the Eastern Mediterranean’s vast natural gas reserves have become a focal point for Turkish naval operations. In order to facilitate the respective policy, Turkey has procure two oil/gas exploration ships, Yavuz and Fatih in order to counter any effort by other nations to exploit what it sees as Turkey’s legal rights in the Mediterranean, against notably Greece and Cyprus[iv]. By deploying naval forces to escort exploration and drilling vessels, Turkey aims to secure its share of these resources while challenging rival claims despite the upheaval and conflicts they can cause with NATO member Greece and West Allies Israel and Egypt. At the same time the Turkish naval forces target to secure undersea pipelines as and other related infrastructure[v].

To back its maritime ambitions, Turkey has been investing heavily in naval modernization. The Turkish Navy has become one of the most advanced in the region, incorporating domestically developed technology and production, while achieving strategic autonomy and enhance its operational capabilities. At the heart stands the MILGEM program that include the construction of 4 new corvettes and 8 of the Istanbul class frigates armed with indigenous systems such as the CENK 3D AESA radar, the MIDLAS VLS and the Sapand and SIPER SAM systems[vi].  At the same time older units such as the Barbaros frigates are getting their equipment upgraded with indigenous system in a program similar to the modernization of the G class frigates, the Turkish Oliver Hazard frigates, as it had taken place 10 years ago. High in the strategic concept of the expansion program stands the acquisition of the six Reis class submarines of the German type 214 that will be materialized by 2029, as and the new amphibious air assault dock ship of the Turkish navy the Anadolu.  The new submarines have the capacity to perform Sea Denial operations with great capability due to their AIP system that allows them to stay under the water for large durations.

The TCG Anadolu, marks a significant leap in power projection capabilities while at the same time is designed to support both naval operations and humanitarian missions. Those capabilities are meant to be enhanced by the use of UAVs and UCAVs from the decks of Anadolu, the UAV Baykar and the MIUS Kizilelma UCAV in respect[vii]. Beside those programs Turkey has also developed a broad range of unmanned surface and underwater vessels, reflecting its broader embrace of drone technology. Further development includes the construction of the air defense destroyer TF 2000 a further upgrade of the indigenous MILGEM program. However the construction of those warships are not the only part of the Turkish naval effort. Electronic warfare systems, the ADVENT combat management system and direct energy systems, not only are design to boost the new fleet, but also are completely domestically developed ensuring a large degree of independency of the Turkish military industry[viii].

Those advancements signify Turkey’s intention to transition from a regional naval power to a force capable of exerting influence across broader seas as it has been noted, Turkey seeks transition from a regional naval power to a blue-water navy capable of projecting influence beyond its immediate surroundings. This involves expanding operational capabilities in the Mediterranean, Black Sea, Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean as it has been stated. An effort that in Turkey despite the aggressive stand, it is view as an adaptation from territorial defense to forward overseas defense[ix]. Turkey uses its navy to build strategic alliances, participate in international exercises, and conduct humanitarian missions. With conducting naval diplomacy with friendly states Turkey plans to strengthens own regional standing and fosters relationships with nations in the Middle East, Africa, and beyond. A clear indication of this effort is the announcements regarding Turkeys second carrier, which as it seems it is going to be a full capable aircraft carrier. With a displacement of 60.000 tons and 285 meters in length, the ship it will include three runways with a modular ramp and the capacity to support up to fifty fighters[x]. This ship will give a quantum leap on the Turkish navy capabilities, especially in regards to the capacity of fleet air protection and power projection in distant seas or areas far away from the coastline of Turkey.

At the heart of Turkey’s maritime ambitions lays Eastern Mediterranean, which Turkey sees as an entry of sea born trade, a significant and vital lifeline according to Turkish policy were more than 87 percent of the country’s trade is conducted via maritime ports, while several transnational pipelines are passing through the adjust Turkish territorial waters[xi]. Further, discoveries of significant natural gas reserves have turned the region into an energy hotspot, intensifying disputes over EEZ boundaries. All the adjust states beside Turkey have discovered great gas resources in the region and Turkey as it seems desire a share. In Israel the Leviathan field has an estimated reserves of 22 trillion cubic feet while Egypt’s Zohr field has an estimated 30 trillion cubic feet to adds Cyprus Aphrodite field with 5 trillion cubic feet[xii].

As such Turkey’s claims are in direct conflict with those of Greece and Cyprus, who have delimitated their EEZs in agreements that Ankara rejects. At the same time Turkey has declare that is determined to protect what it is sees as the right of the illegal Turkish Cypriot entity regarding the adjust sea-based energy resources[xiii]. Turkey’s unilateral and aggressive exploration activities, an effort to redefine the maritime boundaries that are often accompanied by naval escorts, have led to heightened tensions with the European Union and NATO allies.

Despite Turkey’s assertiveness has drawn criticism from the EU, NATO and other actors with sanctions and diplomatic isolation as potential consequences, Turkey has proceeded in broadening its maritime expansion in the area despite resulting in conflict even with external actors such as France. Furthermore, Turkey is rumored to build a new Turkish naval base in Northern Cyprus, despite the illegal nature of such an action, and this is part of a broader planning of increasing its projection of power in the Eastern Mediterranean[xiv].

This is not the only dubius Turkish action. In 2019, Turkey signed a maritime boundary agreement with Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA), extending Turkey’s maritime claims and challenging Greek and Egyptian interests, actively involving its self in the Libyan civil war. In the essence of the agreement lies that no gas or oil route in the Eastern Mediterranean will be secure without Turkey’s participation or approval[xv]. This move was criticized by Greece and the EU but underscored Ankara’s willingness to use diplomacy and military means to advance its maritime agenda. Further and despite the international arms embargo and condemnations, Turkey also maintains two frigates permantly stationed in the coast of Libya in order to provide naval and air defense support to the regime of Tripoli[xvi], while at the same time it had conducted operations in Libya in order to support the troops of the Government of National Accord[xvii]. In violating the sanctions and the international arms embargo, Turkey did not even hesitate to allegedly target a French warship enforcing it, while Turkish ships were supplying the Tripoli government with ammunitions and other material.

As such the concern of the adjust nations to the East Mediterranean have increase and so the possibility for confrontation, at least in a cold war manner. The tensions with Greece and Cyprus over the dispute of the Aegean and the current situation on and adjust to Cyprus are well known and have decade long roots. However, this time, the increasing militarization of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean have resulted in collusion also with Israel. A confrontation that Turkey does not deny. Israel concerns is rising and as a starting point is concerned with the creation of a drone base in Northern Cyprus[xviii] as and the desire of Turkey to control Eastern Mediterranean, the lifeline of Israel to the West and the rest of the world. At the same time Turkey seems to see the upgrade of Israel naval assets and especially the deployment of cruise missile Israeli submarines in the Mediterranean as a source of concern.

The possibility of an Israeli Turkish confrontation stands as a side show compare to the possibility of a confrontation with Greece and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Main reasons for the conflict stand the significant gas resources that have been discovered as and the delimitation prosses of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)[xix]. In an effort to destabilize any agreement according to the respected legislation, in the 2019 Turkish – Libyan maritime agreement, the two parties established an EEZ, ignoring the Greek Cypriot EEZs and to a certain part the Egyptian EEZ. The result was a bilateral agreement between Greece and Egypt according to their own delimitation process. In respect to Cyprus, Turkey flex its newly established naval power by escorting drilling ships that violate the Cypriote EEZ, to show that Turkey does not recognize it and have the capacity to enforce the issue.

The discovery of natural resources in the Eastern Mediterranean has indeed drove all parties Greece, Israel and Egypt to modernize and increase their navies. However, none have gone to the level of power projection and Sea Control capabilities that Turkey is planning and is developing. The Egyptian navy has acquired two Mistral class amphibious assault ships plus two FREMM multipurpose frigates, while the Israeli navy has procured six new Dolphin class submarines and four Sa’ar 6 corvettes[xx]. Those however procurements are restricted to the protection of the gas facilities and patrolling the EEZ and in none occasion have the capacity or potentiality of controlling the East Mediterranean in a such a way as Turkey is planning and is developing its navy. On the other side Greece despite the renown Greek commercial fleet, possess a Green Water Navy restricted within the Aegean Sea and only now the Greek government is moving towards a more capable naval force in order to counter the Turkish desires.

In the same respect as Israel, Egypt, which has delimitated its EEZ with Greece and Cyprus, views Turkey’s maritime claims as aggressive and Cairo’s own naval expansion aims to counterbalance Turkish influence. As a result, the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), comprising Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority, excludes Turkey and underscores regional opposition to Ankara’s policies. At the same time the EU has criticized Turkey’s drilling activities and imposed limited sanctions, but it remains divided over a tougher stance due to economic and strategic ties with Ankara, while the U.S. has supported Greece and Cyprus in their disputes. Russia on the other hand maintains a strategic interest in the region and avoids direct involvement in Turkey’s maritime conflicts.

In any case Turkey’s maritime ambitions are not without challenges, while ambitious, sustaining Turkey’s naval modernization and energy exploration efforts requires significant resources, which could strain the national budget. Further Turkey’s assertive maritime policies risk isolating it from allies and regional partners and while Turkey might view its naval expansion as a means of safeguarding its sovereignty, its neighboring states perceive it as a threat. In any case Turkey’s maritime ambitions reflect a broader shift in its foreign and security policies under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. As Turkey continues to chart its course in the maritime realm, its actions will significantly influence the geopolitics of its surrounding seas

Turkey’s naval ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean reflect its quest for regional influence, economic security, and strategic autonomy. While those moves have strengthened Turkey’s maritime capabilities, they have also deepened tensions with adjacent states and international organizations. Navigating this complex web of disputes will require skillful diplomacy, restraint, and a willingness to engage in constructive dialogue, qualities that Turkey either has shown that it does not possess or it is not willing to engage its self with. In any case, without such efforts, the Eastern Mediterranean risks becoming a flashpoint for broader geopolitical conflict at Turkeys cost and liability.

*Constantinos Kyprios

Marketing Officer, Katradis SA

[i] Betul Usta, (22/9/2024), “From Indian Ocean to Aden, Turkish Navy boosts strategic presence”, Dailyshabah.
[ii] Ezgi Akin, (24/7/2024), “Somaliland warns against Turkey’s naval deployment off Somalia’s coast’, AL-MONITOR
[iii] Betul Usta, (22/9/2024), “From Indian Ocean to Aden, Turkish Navy boosts strategic presence”, Dailyshabah
[iv] How Turkey became a strong naval power in recent years’, TRT WORLD
[v] Betul Usta, (22/9/2024), “From Indian Ocean to Aden, Turkish Navy boosts strategic presence”, Dailyshabah
[vi] Tayfun Ozberk (24/1/2024), “Turkey inks deal to replace four foreign-made weapons with local types’, defensenews.com
[vii] Tayfun Ozberk (1/5/2022), “Here is how UAVs will be recovered aboard TCG Anadolu”, navalnews.com
[viii] ‘How Turkey became a strong naval power in recent years’, TRT WORLD  & Betul Usta, (22/9/2024), “From Indian Ocean to Aden, Turkish Navy boosts strategic presence”, Dailyshabah
[ix] Dorian Jones (14/9/2024) “Turkey flexes naval muscles as neighbours fear escalating arm race”, rfi
[x] Peter Suciu (24/3/2024), ‘Turkey: The Next Aircraft Carrier Superpower?’, nationalinterest.
[xi] ‘How Turkey became a strong naval power in recent years’, TRT WORLD
[xii] Emmanuel Karagiannis (22/6/2021), ‘The Coming Naval Arms Race in the Eastern Mediterranean’, rusi.org.
[xiii] Betul Usta, (22/9/2024), “From Indian Ocean to Aden, Turkish Navy boosts strategic presence”, Dailyshabah
[xiv] ‘How Turkey became a strong naval power in recent years’, TRT WORLD
[xv] How Turkey became a strong naval power in recent years’, TRT WORLD
[xvi] Betul Usta, (22/9/2024), “From Indian Ocean to Aden, Turkish Navy boosts strategic presence”, Dailyshabah
[xvii] Emmanuel Karagiannis (22/6/2021), ‘The Coming Naval Arms Race in the Eastern Mediterranean’, rusi.org.
[xviii] Dorian Jones (14/9/2024) “Turkey flexes naval muscles as neighbours fear escalating arm race”, rfi
[xix] Emmanuel Karagiannis (22/6/2021), ‘The Coming Naval Arms Race in the Eastern Mediterranean’, rusi.org.
[xx] Emmanuel Karagiannis (22/6/2021), ‘The Coming Naval Arms Race in the Eastern Mediterranean’, rusi.org.